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This dissertation contains essays on three questions about
the labor market. In light of the fact that firms account for
a substantial share of earnings inequality, Chapter 1 asks
why some firms pay their employees so much and some
so little. Although the standard explanation is that search
frictions support an equilibrium with rents, this paper finds
that compensating differentials are at least as important. To
reach this finding, the paper develops a structural search
model and estimates it on U.S. administrative data with 1.5
million firms and 100 million workers. The model analyzes the revealed preference information contained in how
workers move between firms. Compensating differentials are
revealed when workers systematically move to lower-paying
firms, while rents are revealed when workers systematically
move to higher-paying firms. With the number of parameters
proportional to the number of firms (1.5 million), standard
estimation approaches are infeasible. The paper develops an
estimation approach that is feasible for data on this scale.
The approach uses tools from numerical linear algebra to
measure central tendency of worker flows, which is closely
related to the ranking of firms revealed by workers’ choices.
Chapter 2 asks why men and women work at different
firms. It builds on Chapter 1 to consider two explanations:
1) men and women might search from different offer
distributions, and 2) men and women might have different
rankings of firms. I find that the first explanation—women
search from a lower-paying offer distribution than men—is
the dominant one.
Chapter 3 asks what are the long-run effects of the minimum wage? An empirical consensus suggests that there are
small employment effects of minimum wage increases. This
chapter argues that these are short-run elasticities. Long-run
elasticities, which may differ from short-run elasticities, are
more policy relevant. To shed light on these questions, this
chapter develops a dynamic industry equilibrium model of
labor demand. The model makes two points. First, long-run
regressions have been misinterpreted because even if the
short- and long-run employment elasticities differ, standard
methods would not detect a difference using U.S. variation. Second, the model offers a reconciliation of the small
estimated short-run employment effects with the commonly
found pass-through of minimum wage increases to product
prices.
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Chapter 1: Ranking Firms Using
Revealed Preference
Firms play a central role in explaining worker earnings.
Conditional on person fixed effects, firms account for over
20 percent of the variance of worker earnings (e.g., Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis [1999] and Card, Heining, and Kline
[2013]). But there is little work asking why firms play such
a central role. There are two main explanations that differ in
whether, from the worker perspective, high-paying firms are
high-value firms: rents and compensating differentials. Rents
is the leading explanation in the literature (e.g., Postel-Vinay
and Robin [2002]). In the rents explanation, frictions prevent
workers from bidding away the rents at high-paying firms. In
this explanation, workers are lucky to end up at high-paying
firms. As a result, high-paying firms are high-value firms.
In contrast, in the compensating differentials explanation
(e.g., Rosen [1986)]), firms differ both in how much they
pay and in nonpay characteristics. In this explanation, higher
pay compensates for variation in unpleasant nonpay characteristics. As a result, high-paying firms are not high-value
firms. Thus, measuring the relative importance of rents and
compensating differentials means figuring out whether highpaying firms are high-value firms.
To distinguish between high-paying and high-value firms,
this chapter estimates the value of working at a firm without
using information in pay. Specifically, I use information in
quantities. To do so, I exploit the revealed preference idea
embedded in search models that workers move to firms with
higher value. Using U.S. matched employer-employee data
with 1.5 million firms, I map the 1.5 million by 1.5 million
matrix of worker flows across firms into the value of working
at each firm.
By comparing the firm-level values to firm-level pay, I
find that both rents and compensating differentials explanations are operative, but compensating differentials are
more important. This finding has four (closely related)
implications. First it shows that in many cases the conventional interpretation of high-paying firms as “good” firms
is not warranted. Second, it contrasts with the conventional
wisdom that compensating differentials are unimportant in
explaining the variance of worker earnings. Third, it resolves
a puzzle that benchmark search models are unable to reproduce the extent of earnings dispersion while also yielding
plausible values of nonemployment. Fourth, the distribution
of compensating differentials across firms means that the
variance of earnings is larger than it would be if all jobs were
equally pleasant.
In the first part of the chapter, I develop a simple model
of the labor market that contains both the rents and the
compensating differentials explanations and develop tools
to estimate it using only quantity information. The model
is a benchmark partial equilibrium utility-posting model in
the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The nonstandard
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ingredients in the model are that firms post a utility offer
that consists of both earnings and a nonpecuniary bundle
and that workers receive idiosyncratic utility draws (taste
shocks) each period. On the one hand, the rents explanation
is contained in the model because there is the possibility of
equilibrium dispersion: different firms offer different levels
of utility. On the other hand, the compensating differentials
explanation is contained in the model because high earnings
might be offset by a low nonpecuniary bundle. The role of
the idiosyncratic utility draws is to add preference heterogeneity and allow workers to make different decisions when
faced with the same choice. Specifically, these draws explain
why there would be flows both from firm A to firm B and
from firm B to firm A.
I estimate the model in two steps. First, I isolate the
transitions that reveal preferences by using information about
what the worker’s coworkers were doing at the time of the
separation. In the spirit of the displaced worker literature
(Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993), if an unusually
high share of coworkers were also separating, then a firmlevel shock caused the workers to leave, and there is a high
probability that any particular separation was exogenous. In
contrast, if turnover levels look normal, then this separation
was likely idiosyncratic to the worker.
Second, I measure the central tendency of worker flows.
I record worker flows in a 1.5 million by 1.5 million matrix,
where one cell is the number of workers who go from firm
A to firm B. The model implies a set of linear restrictions on
the entries in this matrix and a flow-relevant firm-level value.
The flow-relevant firm-level value captures the central tendency of worker flows and is a known function of structural
parameters.
Computing this central tendency of worker flows—and
showing that it exists and has a meaningful economic
interpretation—is the main technical contribution of this
chapter. The central tendency of worker flows is captured by
the top eigenvector of a normalized matrix of worker flows.
Showing when this eigenvector exists and is unique requires
a new analytical result. Computing the eigenvector relies on
techniques from numerical linear algebra that are scalable to
massive data sets such as a 1.5 million by 1.5 million matrix.
In addition to the value of a firm, two factors affect the
central tendency of mobility. First, a large firm will naturally have more workers moving away from it than a small
firm. I account for this because I observe firm size. Second, a firm that makes a lot of offers will naturally have
more workers moving toward it. I account for this because
I estimate the offer distribution using information in nonemployment-to-employer flows. By jointly estimating the
offer distribution and the value of nonemployment, I allow
nonemployed workers to reject offers.
In the second part of the chapter, I estimate the earnings
that firms post and show how to combine these with the
estimates of firm values to decompose the variation in firm-
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level earnings into compensating differentials and rents. The
model implies that—as in Abowd and Schmutte (2014)—I
can estimate the earnings that firms post using a selectioncorrected version of the statistical decomposition pioneered
by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (and also used by
Card, Heining, and Kline [2013]), which controls for person
effects.
Because I use revealed preference at the firm level, I
can identify compensating differentials. At the individual
level, about a third of employer-to-employer moves result in
earnings cuts. As the literature recognizes, this finding does
not identify compensating differentials because the pay cut
might reflect idiosyncratic factors that are not priced in the
labor market. At the firm level, however, systematic patterns
of workers moving from higher-paying to lower-paying firms
indicates factors that are valued by all workers and are priced
in the labor market.
Formally, I prove an identification result to show how to
measure the relative roles of compensating differentials and
rents. Combining utilities and earnings gives a lower bound
on the variance of nonpecuniary characteristics, which is the
extent of compensating differentials. The complement is the
role of rents in explaining the variance of earnings. The identification result is consistent with an argument in the search
literature that compensating differentials are hard to find
because desirable nonearnings factors might be positively
correlated with earnings (Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed
1998; Lang and Majumdar 2004). Specifically, I distinguish
between Rosen and Mortensen amenities. Rosen amenities
generate compensating differentials. In contrast, Mortensen
amenities are positively correlated with earnings and generate equilibrium dispersion; for example, some high-paying
firms might also offer great benefits. The result shows that
in my framework the variance of Mortensen amenities is not
identified.
I estimate the model on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics data set. Compensating differentials explain twice as much of the variance of
firm-level earnings as rents. The estimated ranking of sectors
is intuitively plausible, as is the implied distribution of nonpay characteristics. For example, education has good nonpay
characteristics, while many blue-collar sectors have bad
nonpay characteristics. The central finding that compensating
differentials are at least as important as rents holds within
subgroups defined by age and gender.
The finding that compensating differentials are important
contrasts with conventional wisdom.1 Research that looks at
specific amenities rarely finds robust evidence that amenities
are priced in the labor market. By using revealed preference
at the firm-level, however, I overcome a few challenges
in this literature. First, I distinguish between Rosen and
Mortensen amenities to allow for some amenities to be
unpriced and contribute to dispersion in firm-level value.
Second, revealed preference takes into account the entire
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bundle of amenities. As a result, it does not take a stand on
what workers value or how firms use amenities to offset
other amenities. Third, at the firm level, revealed preference
uncovers amenities that are priced. In contrast, at the individual level, revealed preference can uncover idiosyncratic
factors that are unlikely to be priced.
The finding of a large role for compensating differentials
helps resolve the puzzle emphasized by Hornstein, Krusell,
and Violante (2011) that benchmark search models cannot
generate the extent of observed residual earnings inequality.
I find that workers act as if a large share of the variance of
firm-level earnings does not reflect variation in value. I also
find an empirically reasonable value for nonemployment, and
thus pass a crucial test they propose.
Finally, if the estimated nonpay characteristics were
removed and earnings changed to compensate workers, then
earnings inequality would decline. The effect depends on the
correlation between earnings potential and nonpay characteristics. In this counterfactual, earnings inequality as measured
by the variance of earnings declines. Many low-paying jobs
come with good amenities, so this reduction comes mainly
from the lower tail of the income distribution shifting up.
Chapter 2: Why Do Men and Women Work in
Different Firms?
Men are more likely than women to work in both highwage firms and high-wage industries. This sorting component accounts for 9 log points of the 36 log point (about 25
percent) gender earnings gap in the United States. A core
interpretive issue is whether this sorting component reflects
discrimination or differences in preferences.2 The discrimination explanation is that women would like to work at
the same firms or in the same industries as men, but are
prevented from doing so. The preference explanation is that
there are nonpecuniary characteristics that differ across the
low- and high-paying firms, and women value these nonpecuniary characteristics more than men. For example, women
might highly value flexibility while men do not.
In this chapter, I build on Chapter 1 to shed light on
these two explanations. I begin by establishing the key fact
that this chapter is interested in understanding: men are at
higher-paying firms than women in the United States, and
more generally, that men and women are sorted in the labor
market. Building on Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016), who
study Portugal, I estimate the Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
(1999) decomposition separately for men and women using
data from the United States. This decomposition amounts
to using the complete set of wage changes of workers who
switch firms to estimate a firm effect in earnings. Estimating
the decomposition separately for men and women allows me
to construct gender-specific earnings premia at each firm. I
reproduce the finding of Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016)
that the sorting of men and women across firms is quantita-
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tively important; indeed, I find that the sorting component is
more important in the United States than in their Portugese
context.
I then explain why men and women are sorted. Following Chapter 1, I record a partial equilibrium utility-posting
search model in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
where the only nonstandard ingredient is that firms post utility offers that combine a wage and a nonpecuniary bundle,
and there is a (transitory) idiosyncratic utility draw in each
match, which explains why people might make different
choices. The model estimates revealed values of employers
by taking into account the network structure of accepted
offers and rejected offers.
The model embeds versions of both the preference and
discrimination explanations for why men and women are
sorted. The preference explanation in the model is that men
and women rank firms differently; therefore, given the same
set of opportunities, they would end up in different firms.
The discrimination explanation in the model is that men and
women receive a different set of offers, and so given the
same preferences end up in different firms.
To separate the preference and discrimination explanations, I estimate the model separately by men and women.
The implicit assumption in this exercise, as with standard
earnings decomposition exercises, is that men and women
operate in separate labor markets. This allows me to estimate
separate offer distributions (opportunities), values (preferences), and earnings for men and women. In particular,
I am able to estimate separate offer probabilities, values,
and earnings for men and women firm by firm. While the
model relies on numerous strong assumptions, estimation
is completely nonparametric along the dimensions that this
chapter is interested in. Namely, I impose no assumptions
on the shape of the offer distribution, no assumptions on the
distribution of employer values, and no assumptions on the
relationship between men’s and women’s preferences or offer
distributions.
My principal results are as follows. First, I find that men
and women are systematically sorted in the labor market.
About 60 percent of men’s coworkers are men, while only
about 40 percent of women’s coworkers are men. This finding is quantitatively consistent with the U.S. results in Hellerstein, Neumark, and Mcinerney (2008, p. 183). Second, I
find that this sorting explains over 25 percent of the earnings
gap (given the nature of the data, some of this might include
differences in hours). This finding is robust to using men’s
or women’s earnings to compute how well-paying firms are.
This extends the finding of Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016)
(for Portugal) that men are systematically employed in higher-paying firms than women.
I then use the model to interpret the reasons and consequences of sorting. The model points to differences in the
offer distribution rather than differences in preferences to
explain why men and women are sorted. Men’s and women’s

2016 Dissertation Summaries

preferences over firms are estimated to be highly correlated.
For example, the overall estimated values have a correlation of 0.89. When I aggregate to the 4-digit industry level
(which explains two-thirds of the sorting component of the
gender wage gap), the correlation is 0.98. But I estimate that
women search from a lower-paying distribution. This result
should be interpreted cautiously since the offer distribution
is a reduced-form object that may itself contain revealed
preference information. (Put differently, the fact that women
are less likely to receive offers from high-paying firms may
reflect the fact that they do not want to work at those firms,
rather than the fact that they do not receive offers from these
firms.) The model also allows me to compare the distribution
of employer values at the firms that employ men relative
to the firms that employ women. Taking the model at face
value, the estimates indicate that men and women are at
approximately equal-valued firms regardless of whether it is
men’s or women’s values that are used to value the firms.

Chapter 3: Are There Long-Run Effects of the
Minimum Wage?
Inflation and rising real wages make most minimum wage
increases temporary. As such, the empirical minimum wage
literature has made substantial progress estimating the shortrun employment effects of minimum wage increases. This
effect appears to be small. Despite apparent consensus, the
profession remains divided about the employment effects of
minimum wage increases.
A reasonable reading of this divide is that there are some
questions about the effects of minimum wage increases for
which the empirical consensus provides the answer. For
other questions, however, economists extrapolate differently
depending on whether they think that the relevant short- and
long-run employment elasticities differ. To the question,
“What is the employment effect of a temporary nominal minimum wage increase likely to be?”, the empirical consensus
suggests that there are unlikely to be significant employment effects, because similar increases have not resulted in
significant employment effects. To the question, “What is
the employment effect—after a few years—of a permanent
minimum wage increase?”, the empirical consensus suggests
an answer only if the short- and long-run elasticities of minimum wage increases are the same. In the United States, this
latter question is of immediate policy relevance: President
Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address contained a proposal to index the federal minimum wage to inflation, which
would be a more permanent increase.
To contribute to this important debate, this chapter studies
the empirical implications of a model that distinguishes
between the short- and long-run employment elasticities. The
model is based on the putty-clay nature of capital. It was first
informally discussed in the minimum wage context by Card
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and Krueger (1995, pp. 366–368), and I build on the Gourio
(2011) version.
In the model, when firms pay the entry cost of building
a machine, they can freely substitute between capital and
labor. Once capital is installed, a firm cannot change its labor
demand.
The key features of the model are that the labor demand
choice of an entering firm is a forward-looking, dynamic
decision that depends on the (expected) stochastic process
for minimum wages. And because only some firms adjust
each period, the industry-level labor demand response to a
minimum wage increase is slow, and also depends on the
stochastic process for minimum wages.
The model has two main empirical implications. The
first empirical implication is that the reduced-form long-run
effects estimated in the literature are essentially uninformative about the true long-run elasticity. I simulate employment
data from the model to replicate the data set used in Dube,
Lester, and Reich (2010), who find very small short-run
employment effects and, using a common reduced-form
long-run regression, find no distinction between the shortand long-run employment effects of minimum wages in
the United States. They interpret these results as evidence
against the view that short- and long-run elasticities differ.
On the simulated data, however, the reduced-form regression recovers a long-run employment effect that is barely
different than the short-run employment effect. As such, the
chapter suggests that it would be a mistake to infer from
existing empirical work that proposals to index minimum
wages to inflation would have minimal effects on employment. Taking the model at face value shows how misleading
such an inference might be: the results in the chapter show
that a contemporaneous elasticity of −0.002 in response to a
temporary increase is consistent with an elasticity after six
years of −0.252 for a permanent increase.
The second empirical implication is that the putty-clay
model is consistent with the pass-through of minimum wage
increases to product prices commonly found in the literature,
even though minimum wage increases are relatively temporary. Card and Krueger (1994, p. 792) emphasize that their
finding of product price rises in response to minimum wage
increases are inconsistent “with models in which employers
face supply constraints (e.g., monopsony or equilibrium
search models).” Despite this, the minimum wage literature
has focused on models of search frictions to rationalize the
small employment effects without focusing on the price
results.
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Notes
1. For example, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011, p. 2883)
write that compensating differentials “does not show too much
promise” in explaining earnings dispersion.
2 See, for example, the Council of Economic Advisers (2015,
p. 3). https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
equal_pay_issue_brief_final.pdf (accessed October 6, 2016).
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